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FOREWORD
By William A. Radlinski, Acting Director
U. S. Geological Survey
This report, prepared for the Geological Survey by a team of NASA
experts, examines the feasibility of applying to offshore oil and gas operations
advanced engineering techniques designed to increase the reliability of safety
and antipollution equipment.
As an outgrowth of earlier informal discussions, Geological Survey,
in May 1971, requested NASA's Mississippi Test Facility to propose^ plan
by which the applicability of NASA procedures for quality control and hazard
analysis to offshore oil and gas operations might be determined. With the
cooperation of the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center and the Office of
Manned Space Flight, a study plan was developed and approved in July 1971
and a team of NASA personnel assembled to carry out this study for Geological
Survey during the period from mid-August to mid-October 1971. This report
is the result.
While quality control and hazard analysis procedures are not unique to
the aerospace industry, techniques to assure the functional reliability of complex
hardware systems were brought to a state of high perfection by NASA in its
space program. On the federally-managed Outer Continental Shelf in the Gulf
of Mexico, there are now over 1800 drilling and production platforms each of
which has intricate electrical, mechanical, and hydraulic systems which must
function reliably-if accidents and pollution incidents are to be avoided. Through
the cooperation of NASA and of industries operating on the Outer Continental
Shelf, it has been possible for technical experts from NASA's staff to study
firsthand offshore oil and gas facilities and operations. These experienced
engineers and technicians present in this report their preliminary recommen-
dations for action by the Federal Government and the oil industry to provide
greater assurance that offshore energy resources can be produced with reason-
able safety and protection from pollution of the marine and coastal environment.
Actions that the team recommend to be taken by Government and
industry include:
1. Systematic evaluation of equipment failures to prevent recurrence
2. A research and development program for equipment and procedures
improvement
111
3. Refined equipment specifications for safety and pollution prevention
4. Safety and antipollution training and motivation of oil and gas
platform personnel to reduce human error.
This study and report are part of a continuing effort by the Geological
Survey to explore all avenues offering potential for improving safety and
avoiding pollution associated with offshore oil and gas operations. It appears
from the preliminary analysis that the report offers constructive recommenda-
tions concerning the problems that have been associated with the recent serious
events on the Outer Continental Shelf, and it is intended that action on them be
taken promptly.
IV
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TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM X-2567
APPLICABILITY OF NASA CONTRACT QUALITY MANAGEMENT
AND FAILURE MODE EFFECT ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
TO THE USGS OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL
AND GAS LEASE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
I. INTRODUCTION
With a view toward improving safety and pollution prevention and in
accordance with an agreement between the Director, U. S. Geological Survey
(USGS) and NASA's George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), a team
consisting of NASA personnel and a USGS representative conducted a study
of offshore drilling and production operations during the period August 16
through October 8, 1971. Specifically, the study was to determine:
1. The practicality of adopting NASA contractual quality management
(quality control) techniques to the USGS/Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) lease
management functions
2. The applicability of Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) to
the drilling, production, and delivery systems in use offshore
3. The impact on industrial offshore operations and onshore management
operations required to carry out a full-scale investigation and systems design
for either quality control or FMEA programs
4. The probable changes in law or regulation required for either the
full-scale investigation or implementation of either program to offshore
operations.
The team was composed of Morris K. Dyer, MSFC/Huntsville,
chairman; Dewey G. Little, MSFC/Mississippi Test Facility, alternate
chairman; Earl G. Hoard, MSFC/Huntsville, member (FMEA); Rayford
Campbell, MSFC/Michoud Assembly Facility (quality control); and Alfred C.
Taylor, MSFC/Michoud Assembly Facility (quality control). The USGS
liaison was Elmo G. Hubble, district engineer, Lafayette District No. 2, Gulf
Coast Region. Lyle C. Curran, MSFC Quality and Reliability Assurance
Laboratory; and Louis Fabian, MSFC Astronautics Laboratory, served as
consultants to the team.
II. STUDY APPROACH
To achieve these objectives, it was necessary that the team become
acquainted with the USGS organization and lease management methods at the
national, regional, and district levels, as well as the constraints, if any,
imposed by law or regulation that might affect implementation of either quality
control or FMEA procedures. The team also became familiar with the
technical, inspection, or other related requirements placed by USGS or other
governmental agencies on offshore oil and gas operators and the industry
management attitudes and procedures in general and specifically as pertain to
• quality control and design analysis. Finally, the team familiarized itself with
the nature of offshore operations.
To accomplish these objectives the team had meeting in Washington,
D. C., with the Department of Interior, USGS, Bureau of Mines, and
Department of Transportation, Office of Pipeline Safety. In New Orleans,
Louisiana, it met with the USGS Gulf Coast Region Office and the OCS
Operators Committee ( subcommittee on OCS Orders). Further, it visited a
major operator's district office, an independent operator/drilling contractor,
and a company providing inspection/testing services on the OCS for several
operators. Team representatives also met with the U. S. Coast Guard, Office
of Marine Inspections, 8th District, and attended OCS lease sale hearings
conducted September 8 and 9, 1971.
Additionally, the team visited the USGS District Office of Gulf Coast
Region, Lafayette, Louisiana; Louisiana State Department of Conservation,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana; a major fabricator of platforms for use in offshore
drilling and producing operations; and a major operator's area office in Morgan
City, Louisiana. In Houston, Texas, it inspected a manufacturer of subsurface
safety valves and other critical equipment used on the OCS as well as a major
operator's facility, where tests on safety and other equipment used on the OCS
were being performed, and the production research headquarters of a major
operator. The team spent several days on production platforms and drilling
rigs in the Gulf of Mexico.
During each of the above meetings, the team members had detailed
discussions with responsible personnel and viewed operations. They also
examined hardware when appropriate, and they reviewed problems that have
caused or could cause accidents and/or pollution. The team also concerned
itself with documentation, when available. In order that the applicability of the
NASA contract quality management and FMEA approach could be assessed,
th'e discussions and reviews concentrated on:
1. Public laws
2. Government regulations and enforcement
3. Government and industry specifications
4. Equipment and methods research activity
5. Management, organization, and planning
6. Engineering design, documentation, and analysis
7. Procurement
8. Manuf a c hiring
9. Drilling and production
10. Inspection and test
11. Problem/failure causes, reporting and analysis
12. Training
13. Information exchange
14. Written procedures
15. Maintenance
16. Motivation of personnel for safe and pollution-free operations.
At all times, the personnel visited were cooperative, spoke openly
and frankly, and provided the team with documentation requested.
III. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
A. Current Quality Control Status in OCS Operations
From the beginning of the study, it became apparent to the team that
there was an absence of formal quality control organizations and procedures.
In neither government nor industry was an organizational element or an
•individual designated as "quality control." This fact added a new dimension
to the study as it became necessary to examine all facets of the industry to
determine whether any of the functions normally performed by quality control/
reliability organizations were being carried out by other organizational elements.
The examination was thorough, and many hours were devoted to covering the
full range of quality control and systems design elements. With certain very
limited exceptions, inspection is the only quality control activity to emerge
during the study as an element universally utilized. The operators generally
do not perform inspections on the OCS, even those required by USGS, but
very informally employ third party or contract personnel for this effort.
Operators do inspect, with their own or contract personnel, major work such
as platform fabrication or pipeline (flow line) laying, while such work is in
progress.
Most purchases of equipment for use offshore are by catalog or to
American Petroleum Institute (API) specifications, American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) codes, etc. In these cases, no inspection
requirement is placed nor inspection performed at the manufacturer's plant
upon receipt. Platform manufacturers and some equipment manufacturers do
employ inspection as a tool to improve quality rather than because of its
requirement by the Government.
Formal, regularly-scheduled inspection of equipment on the OCS is
primarily limited to those safety and antipollution items required by OCS
Orders No. 8 and 9 and appears to have been instituted because of those
requirements. Little or no use is being made of the records generated as a
result of these inspections for problem prevention purposes, either by the
operators or USGS.
In summary, the lack of identifiable quality control organizational
elements, primary reliance on inspection, and widespread objection to
written procedures or record-keeping indicates a significant lag in quality
control and reliability technology in OCS operations. The need for improved
equipment and methods for offshore operations is recognized; however, the
need for and use of quality and reliability techniques as aids to effecting this
needed improvement is not yet generally appreciated by industry. Figure 1
shows the complexity of organization and interfaces of a representative oil
and gas company performing drilling and production operations on the OCS.
Quality control techniques can be used to help improve total operations.
B. Progress in Achieving Safe and Pollution.-Free
Operation son the OCS
In its study, the team found that significant progress has been made in •
the past 2 years toward achieving safe and pollution-free drilling and production
operations on the OCS. As meetings were held with offshore industry repre-
sentatives and their operations were viewed, it became evident that the good
business and good citizenship reasons for safe and pollution-free operations are
recognized and that sincere attempts are being made to achieve this, often at
significant cost.
There is no doubt, however, that invoking Federal regulations through
the lease instrument (particularly in the detail specified in OCS Orders) as
well as the knowledge that the USGS has enforcement resources and authority,
has provided some necessary guidance to industry and much of the incentive
for industry to expend the time and funds for improvement.
C. Basic Problems Associated with Safety and
Antipollution Aspects of OCS Operations
Although, the OCS petroleum industry has responded in a responsible
manner to the Government's requirements for safety and prevention of
pollution; many failures or malfunctions of safety and antipollution equipment
are occurring. Human error is contributing significantly to the relatively few
serious accidents and pollution incidents that do occur. There is considerable
evidence of a "production first" philosophy in the OCS operations in the Gulf
which is delaying problem resolution. The organization structure and the
allocation of minimal funds for other than production activities are indications
of this attitude. Additional progress toward the goals of safety and pollution-
free environments is the responsibility of management, which must recognize
the need for and provide specific resources to better cope with hazardous
operations and to reduce human errors and equipment malfunctions.
The hazards associated with oil and gas operations are well recognized.
The basic ingredients of fire (fuel, oxidizer, and ignition source) are
continually present. The majority of equipment and procedures to protect
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against the hazards, however, has been developed on a reaction basis. A more
effective method is an analytical effort to recognize problems in advance.
Corrective action for the more serious problems may include design changes,
warning systems, backup systems, or a plan for alternate operations.
Problems peculiar to oil and gas wells, such as sand production,
inefficient subsurface safety equipment, and equipment problems associated
with corrosive atmosphere, have plagued the industry from the beginning. These
can only remain serious problems, however, because of insufficient research
and development efforts.
The solution of these problems will require some additional or
redirected resources, the allocation of which must be made based upon a
cost-effectiveness approach. Implementation of the recommendations of this
study group can assist in demonstrating to management that the resources
allocated can result in at least a reduction in probability of catastrophic loss
and pollution and more on-line production time through improved equipment.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The following discussions and conclusions relate to the basic study
objectives set forth in Section I. The recommendations contained in Section V
are based upon these conclusions.
A. Applicability of NASA Contract Quality
Management Techniques
The NASA contractual quality management approach basically places
technical, quality, and reliability management program requirements with
aerospace companies through the contract instrument. With these is placed
the responsibility for demonstrating, through plans, procedures, and records
that technical requirements are being met. It also includes the evaluation of
company plans and procedures and the systematic monitoring of the company
program to ensure that plans and procedures are being followed and that
technical requirements are being met. This often includes certain inspections
or tests by Government personnel after completion by company personnel.
A key feature of the NASA approach is tailoring requirements and
procedures to the nature and complexity of the hardware and operations
involved. On very complex space systems, the full range of requirements is
applied, whereas only certain of these are applied on less critical, less
complex systems. Even within these requirements, procedures developed for
compliance are tailored as much as possible to the individual situation. Every
attempt is made to achieve the necessary degree of control in the most cost-
effective manner.
The team concludes that the basic NASA contractual quality management
technique is applicable to OCS lease management. It is, in fact, currently
being implemented when the Department of the Interior lease is considered as
the equivalent of the NASA contract.
The OCS operators are now obligated to comply with certain require-
ments (i. e., Federal regulations as detailed by OCS Orders), which include,
in some cases, the development of operational plans and the generation of
records. Also, USGS is evaluating certain operator plans upon submittal, as
well as implementing a system to monitor compliance with lease-imposed
requirements.
While the basic approach applies, the team further concludes that
the majority of NASA quality system requirements are not applicable to OCS
operations because the systems and operations observed, even though critical-
to-safe and pollution-free operations in many individual cases, are not of
sufficient complexity to warrant the broad range of requirements. Also, the
documented technical requirement base (e. g., equipment specifications) over
which quality system requirements are placed has not been sufficiently
developed. Furthermore, the industry operates so informally that the
procedures necessary to demonstrate even elementary quality system com-
pliance do not exist (nor are they needed to the extent employed in the aero-
space industry).
Some subelements of the following requirements [ as contained in NASA
Handbook NHB 5300.4 (IB), "Quality Program Provisions for Aeronautical
and Space System Contractors" (Bibliography, Item 4?)] could easily be
tailored to OCS operations and applied through revision of or development of
new OCS Orders. These are:
1. Training and certification of personnel [ par. 1B202, NHB 5300.4
(IB)]
2. Quality Information [par. 1B203, NHB 5300.4(lB)]
3. Retrieval of records [par. 1B405, NHB 5300.4(lB)]
4. Inspection and test performance (par. 1B705, NHB 5300.4(lB)]
5. Inspection and test records and data [par. 1B706, NHB 5300.4
(IB)]
6. Remedial and preventive action [par. 1B802, NHB 5300.4(IB)]
7. Calibration controls [par. 1B905, NHB 5300.4(lB)]
The applicability of other requirements may become appropriate as the results
accrue from these seven items and as equipment used on the OCS becomes
more sophisticated.
B. Applicability of FMEA to the Drilling,
Production, and Delivery Systems
in Use Offshore
Two of the design analysis techniques used by NASA as an aid to deter-
mining critical equipment and identifying potential problems are: (l) Failure
Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) and (2) Hazard Analysis (HA). Recommenda-
tion No. 4 describes these in general terms, as well as other points pertaining
to this conclusion. Although the study request only mentioned FMEA, pre-
liminary review of documentation for systems utilized on the OCS and the
nature of OCS operations indicated that HA may also be a valuable technique.
Both techniques, therefore, were considered by the study team. It was con-
cluded that
1. Hazards analysis rather than FMEA could be an appropriate tool
for identification of problem areas in systems and methods currently used in
OCS operations
2. More documented control over the design of critical systems and
equipment used on the OCS must be achieved before HA can be fully utilized
3. Initiation of industry use of HA should be through a USGS require-
ment. (See Recommendation No. 5.)
4. The USGS Regional Office has the authority and if provided with
the necessary staffing and tools (engineering documentation, HA methods)
could provide an effective control over the reliability of the critical systems
developed for OCS use.
C. The Extent, Character, and Nature of Access to Industry
Production Operations Offshore, and Management
Operations Onshore, Required to Carry Out a
Full-Scale Investigation and Systems Design
for Quality Management or FMEA Programs
The access to production operations offshore and management operations
onshore that are necessary for full-scale investigation and systems design of
both quality management or FMEA programs would be essentially the same
that the team achieved during this study. As previously mentioned, the spirit
of cooperation received by this team was outstanding. It is felt that this was a
result of the excellent relationship enjoyed between the USGS Gulf Coast
Region and the offshore operators, which the team feels has been brought about
not only by mutual recognition of need and. mutual respect, but by the tact and
diligence exhibited by the regional supervisor, Mr. Robert Evans, and his
staff. With this relationship, it is felt that access could again be gained to
industry through the Gulf Coast Region office for a full-scale investigation.
It is concluded, however, that full-scale investigations of either quality
management or FMEA areas to develop overall programs are neither required
nor desirable. This conclusion is reached since it is felt that the feasibility
study has identified certain basic needs which must be met before overall
programs could be meaningfully devised. Action now should be implementation
of the individual recommendations contained in Section V, coupled with formal
and continuing encouragement of industry to investigate and apply as appropriate
the full range of quality control, reliability (including FMEA), and HA
techniques available.
If, after consideration of the above conclusion, USGS still desires
to conduct a complete investigation and system design for FMEA/HA, a
recommended next step would be selecting a typical offshore operation and
performing a specimen analysis. The operation to analyze could be either a
drilling or production operation. The production operation chosen should
include a platform-to-platform flow (pipe) line operation with the ancillary
equipment necessary for safety and control of the line. This arrangement
would negate the necessity for providing a separate delivery system study,
since the platform-to-platform flow line appears to have essentially the same
characteristics. An analysis of this type would require a group of engineering
personnel familiar with platform mechanical and electrical systems and a
specialist on analysis techniques. The analysis would probably require several
weeks because engineering documentation and operating procedures would
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probably have to be generated by the group, in addition to the time required for
the analysis. Experience data of this type could also be of assistance in
implementing FMEA or HA.
D. Probable Changes in Law or Regulation Required
for Full-Scale Investigation or Implementation
of Quality Management or FMEA Programs
The OCS Act, lease provisions, and regulations were studied to
determine probable changes required to permit full-scale quality management
or FMEA investigations and to implement programs. In addition, other acts,
such as the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 and the Natural
Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 were reviewed, as well as legislation proposed
on September 30, 1970, by Congressman Charles M. Teague, California,
concerning control and prevention of further pollution by oil discharges from
Federal lands off the coast of California (Bibliography, Item 18).
It is concluded that no changes are required in the OCS Act, lease, or
regulations to conduct detailed quality management or FMEA studies, nor to
implement applicable features of either program. Implementation of applicable
quality or FMEA/HA requirements can be effected through OCS Orders.
Implementation of study Recommendation No. 2 concerning information
exchange will require an interpretation from the Justice Department regarding
possible conflict with antitrust laws if the decision is to attempt to have industry
serve as its own focal point. If the Department of Interior decides to serve as
the focal point, a change in the OCS Act may be necessary to provide for this.
Implementation of study Recommendation No. 3 concerning research
and development may require a change in the OCS Act in order to clearly
give the Department of Interior the authority to conduct research and develop-
ment on safety and antipollution equipment for OCS use. As a comparison,
Section 13 of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act specifies that the Secretary of
Transportation shall conduct research and development, testing, and training
to carry out provisions of the Act.
E. Adequacy and Scope of OCS Orders
The study team was asked to assess the general adequacy and scope
of the OCS Orders from the standpoint of safety and prevention of pollution.
The order program was also assessed from the view point of the guidance
provided industry and its acceptance.
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The team concludes that the OCS Order program as structured is moving
in the right direction and that it is providing essential guidance to industry,
which is being accepted as "law" by industry. The technique of using a sub-
committee of the OCS Operators Committee to help develop orders is excellent
in that it gives industry the opportunity to provide technical expertise and assess
impact during development, thereby reducing the possibility of developing
impractical or impossible requirements. It is essential that these orders
continue to be developed for the most part at the regional level and that they be
tailored as necessary for individual regional conditions. However, standard-
ization of requirements among regions, where practical, is desirable.
The study indicates the need for additional or revised orders in the
following areas: metering control, temperature controls on fired vessels,
flame arresters, engineering documentation, training and certification of
personnel inspecting USGS required safety/antipollution devices, standard-
ization of forms, and failure reporting.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are made for consideration by the
Director, USGS. Implementation by the USGS could provide industry with
improved methods of preventing and resolving offshore equipment and personnel
problems, and thereby reduce the probability of accident, pollution, or loss of
production. Implementation could also provide the USGS with improved
methods of determining the need, placing in effect, and maintaining OCS
Orders, as well as improving methods of ensuring compliance with lease
provisions.
In arriving at these recommendations, every effort was made to
consider in practical terms the past history and nature of OCS operations, the
actual needs, the impact of recommendations upon industry and USGS, and
implementation means.
A. USGS/Operations
1. Failure-Reporting and Corrective-Action System. A basic tool
for all reliability and quality control activities is a closed-loop, failure-
reporting and corrective-action program. Failure-reporting involves tabulating
the occurrence of incidents, problems, failures, and out-of-specification
conditions. Corrective action begins with investigation and engineering
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analysis of each reported problem or failure, followed, where appropriate, by
laboratory analysis of failed hardware. The investigations and conclusions
should be documented to provide a basis for remedial action, listings for
repetitive failure searches (maintainability), and applicability to similar parts
for other applications. Corrective action includes appropriate measures to
prevent recurrence of the failure through redesign, stricter test/inspection
standards, improved procedures, etc. The loop is closed only when steps to
prevent recurrence have been checked to insure their effectiveness. Without a
tool of this type to focus management attention on problem areas, it is doubtful
that any real progress can be made toward improvement of equipment or
procedures.
Observed conditions for offshore operations is a policy of replacement
upon failure with no more than visual observation of failed items and without any
type of record being made for the failure. Occasional exceptions were noted at
the initiative of individual field engineers maintaining an informal record for
particular problems. Equipment suppliers appear to place more emphasis on
reporting failures. Malfunction reports are completed for returned hardware
tor management review and action.
In many cases, especially those involving hardware failures, a
requirement for failure analysis should be passed on to the supplier. Even if
this is not done, however, implementation of the recommendation set forth
below will require the operator to work more closely with the supplier in terms
of equipment/procedure interface to achieve a real corrective action rather than
a simple replacement of equipment.
It is therefore recommended that USGS lay the groundwork for the type
of activity, described above, in the drilling and production phase of the oil
industry by requiring monthly summaries from each operator of failure causes
and corrective action taken for all safety equipment specified by OCS Orders.
All accidents and oil spills should follow similar procedures. For the proce-
dure to be effective, its object should be recurrence prevention, with emphasis
placed on the determination of causes, preventive action, and follow-up.
This recommendation, if adopted, will have a significant impact,
primarily because of the change in policy made necessary by the majority of
offshore operators. The statement is often made by offshore people that the
only real test of equipment is to place it in service in the Gulf.
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Whether this is a valid assumption or not, the data from this test
should be utilized to maximum advantage. The basic philosophy to be followed
is that every failure has a cause, every cause can be understood, and every
failure can be corrected or alternate procedures provided.
2. Information Exchange, Even though no intercompany failure report-
ing and corrective action systems exist, individual operators know their overall
problems with safety equipment and methods. There is no formal method now,
however, for the rapid and positive exchange of this information on an industry-
wide basis, so that problems experienced by one operator can possibly be
avoided by others, thus reducing the risk of accident or pollution and that major
or recurring'problems that require research and development effort for resolu-
tion can be quickly identified. Information exchange is primarily through word
of mouth, professional meetings, and technical journals. This method is at
best uncertain. Development of the system outlined in Recommendation No. 1
(Failure-Reporting and Corrective-Action System) by each operator can help
provide the basis for action within the company but does not fill the intercom-
pany information exchange need. Industry representatives state that they
desire to exchange this information more formally but fear that to do so would
be in violation of antitrust laws.
That industry recognizes the need for this is evidenced by the following
quote from the New Orleans newspaper, The Times-Picayune, attributed to an
oil company executive while the study was being made.
"Could all phases of the drilling industry,
including operating company research and
engineering, combine their know-how to
solve the total problem, new system,
rather than incremental improvement
to the many pieces of the problem?"
The answer should be a resounding yes to this question, as the rapid exchange
of information has been one of the keys to the successes achieved in the space
program.
It is recommended that the USGS investigate the legal question of a
possible antitrust law violation regarding formal exchange of hardware and
method problem information within the oil and gas industry* If a favorable
ruling is obtained, USGS should encourage and participate in the development
and operation of the system.
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As an alternative, USGS could become the focal point for this informa-
tion and disseminate it to all concerned parties.
3. Research and Development. A concerted research and develop-
ment program should be initiated as soon as possible for improvement of
safety and antipollution equipment and development of methods of detecting
potential equipment or material failures. Individual companies within the
oil and gas industry have research and development programs that are devoted
primarily to improving production capability in the increasingly adverse
conditions that new discoveries are imposing. Based upon problems experi-
enced within the companies, some individual effort to improve safety and anti-
pollution equipment and methods is included. However many problem areas in
the latter category remain unresolved. A few of these, pointed out to the
study group, are metal fatigue in down-hole tabular goods, mud control devices
and methods, automatic monitoring equipment, and sand erosion detectors.
(See Recommendation No. 7, Wearout Prevention.)
The individual research and development efforts are improving
individual situations. However, redundant efforts are being undertaken in
some cases, while no known efforts are being applied nor is progress being
made in others.
The focal point necessary to identify the total research and develop-
ment needs and to bring concerted effort to bear in meeting these needs is
missing. Since the industry is competitive, with each company primarily
expending its resources to resolve its own problems, it appears that this
research and development focal point should be a body separated from the
competition, such as USGS.
It is recommended that USGS establish a method to determine needs
and conduct or direct the research, testing and development necessary to
improve equipment and methods for an increasingly safe and pollution-free
operation on the OCS. (Note: Implementation of Recommendations No. land
2 can aid greatly in determining needs.)
One product of this effort would be the development of technical data
for inclusion in Government approved standards and specifications. (See
Recommendation No. 4, Standards/Specifications Development and Use.)
An alternate recommendation is that USGS work with the industry in
establishing an organization such as the API to serve as the research and
development focal point, with all companies contributing toward resolution of
problems.
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4. Standards/Specifications Development and Use. The need exists for
USGS to establish and require approved (USGS) standards/specifications for
safety and antipollution devices in OCS operations. The petroleum industry
and USGS rely on standards/specifications developed by API, ASTM, ASME,
ABS, and others, as a minimum requirement in the manufacturing of equip-
ment. The API, consisting of professional engineers representing their
respective companies, appoints local task groups to formulate standards/
specifications according to need. Standards/specifications have been written
for tubular goods, wellhead equipment, production tanks, and other items.
Safety and antipollution equipment, such as subsurface safety valves, blowout
preventers, pressure/temperature sensors, and fluid-level controls, however,
is being used on the OCS for which no standards/specifications are available.
Much of the equipment now operating on offshore rigs and platforms was
basically designed for onshore use and environment.
In reviewing a selected number of available standards/specifications
and during discussions with operators and equipment manufacturing personnel,
the need became evident for the development of new and, in some cases, more
meaningful standards/specifications. Industry personnel stated on several
occasions that while much good work has been done in developing existing
specifications, many are written in general terms and in some instances are
not adequate. The quality of equipment is a concern in the oil industry and
especially to operators on the OCS, yet none of the specifications reviewed
contained the requirement that companies manufacturing products to the
specifications have even a basic quality control system. The assurance of
reliable service in any product depends on its ability to meet certain properties.
This requires the establishment of grade, type, and size classification to
improve quality and provide interchangeability. Methods of testing to deter-
mine adequate properties and performance quality are also necessary. The
development of a sound quality control system by the manufacturer could give
purchasers reasonable assurance that these requirements have been met and
that they have purchased reliable products.
Existing technical data, where available and adequate, should be
utilized in developing standard/specification provisions. When sufficient
technical data are not available, they should be generated by industry and/or
Government research. ( See Recommendation No. 1, Failure-Reporting and
Corrective-Action System.)
The USGS should take the lead in ensuring the rapid development and
use of adequate standards/specifications for all safety and antipollution
equipment to be used on the OCS. The study team, therefore, makes the
following recommendations.
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a. That USGS seek API cooperation in establishing a committee to
function under USGS guidance for the purpose of determining specific needs
and to write, review, and approve standards/specifications for safety and
antipollution equipment. The committee must function under the guidance of
USGS.
b. That specifications developed by the committee contain requirements
for a basic quality control system and, where equipment is to be used in a
deleterious environment, an environmental test program. The committee
should use as a quality system guideline, the quality control provisions of the
Bureau of Mines specification covering fuses for trailing cables used in coal
mines and in NASA Publication NPC 200-3, "Inspection System Provisions
for Suppliers of Space Materials, Parts, Components and Services." (See
Bibliography, Items 13 and 54).
c. That the USGS, through OCS Orders, require the use of approved
standards/specifications.
As an alternate recommendation, if the USGS cannot obtain API
participation, it is recommended that USGS establish a committee, comprised
of appropriate members from the industry, for the purpose of developing
these standards/specifications for equipment and methods used in OCS
opera tions.
5. FMEA/HA. The feasibility of incorporating FMEA techniques into
the lease management program, OCS, oil, and gas operations began with an
attempt to define the need for this type of activity. Discussions with USGS
personnel at each level, concerned with oil and gas operations, reveal a
universal concern with the reliability of the.equipment operating in the Gulf of
Mexico. Staff members of the Oil and Gas Operations Branch expressed
concern with the varying amount of control exercised by offshore operators
over their equipment. Regional office members stated that while other con-
siderations have occupied most of their attention in the past, more activity
directed toward design review was planned for the future. District personnel
offered the opinion that the present OCS Orders do, in fact, have room for
additional coverage for such items as temperature controls for fired vessels,
flame and spark arresters, and inspection of sand-producing well systems.
These observations, coupled with personal contact with offshore
operators and service companies, indicate little organized control over
attempts to upgrade the quality of hardware before installation. This gives
rise to the recommendations that follow.
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The team recommends that USGS request identification of operations
and equipment critical to safety of personnel and pollution prevention. Data
to complete this Critical Items List could be derived from two sources. One,
from compilation of accident history and problem/failure reports, is the topic
of another recommendation. The second source could result from analysis of
the systems utilized to perform a given function. Two types of design/system
analysis most commonly used in industry today are the FMEA and the HA.
Hazard analysis is a broad term covering a spectrum of analytical
tools used to predict where safety problems may exist. Most of the analysis
starts with a hazard or undesired event and works back through the operations
to trace equipment failures and operational or procedural errors that may
have led to the hazard. This procedure is usually accomplished by diagram-
ing the process in the form of a tree, with causative paths as branches (or
roots since work goes from undesired events to progressively lower levels).
Hence, the name of the most commonly used diagraming method is fault tree
(See Example, Fig. 2, page 28.)
The "top down" approach utilized in HA is directly opposed to the
FMEA. The FMEA begins with a known failure mode of a low-level element
within a system and proceeds to evaluate the effect of this failure mode upon
successively higher levels of assembly until the ultimate effect upon a stated
objective (mission success, personnel safety) is determined. A brief example
of the technique is included on pages 25 through 27 (Table l). The two types
of analyses yield comparable results if common ground rules and similar
considerations are used for both approaches. At present HA is considered
more applicable to offshore operation than FMEA for the following reasons.
a. Accident history is one in which operator error is the greater
contributor.
;
b. The HA "top down" method would be more adaptable to yielding
intelligent data than the FMEA "bottom up" approach when low-level hardware
is not well identified.
c. The simplicity of the systems, at the present time, does not require
FMEA to assure complete coverage.
d. The HA is considered more easily explainable to personnel
unfamiliar with design analysis.
The petroleum (drilling and production) industry is not presently
organized and staffed to perform systems analysis, and a requirement for
such would impact the industry significantly. This conclusion is based upon the
following considerations.
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a. Any analytical technique is dependent upon up-to-date and complete
engineering documentation which is not available for the equipment in the Gulf.
b. Personnel trained for this type of activity are not available. The
industry as a whole appears to operate without a formal quality control or
reliability organizational element. Engineering personnel familiar with off-
shore operations could readily adapt to these techniques, but formal training
would be required.
c. Management appears to be highly production-orientated and a
considerable reevaluation of safety and antipollution needs is necessary to
effect positive controls.
Therefore, the study team recommends a step approach as follows.
a. The USGS Gulf Coast Regional Office should be authorized to
implement the proposed design review group.
b. The region should require submission from offshore operators a
list of critical operations to be performed during drilling at time of permit
request. List of critical systems should also be obtained at the time of well
completion, and appropriate reviews conducted with the operator.
c. The requirement for submission of complete HA should be phased
into system starting with new work, with time limits on existing wells.
d. The analysis group should work with operators to eliminate (reduce)
hazardous operations by recommending redesign of hardware or operations.
e. Inspection criteria should be revised to include any additional
critical equipment identified by HA.
The trend of the industry seems to be toward more complex systems
because of deeper water operations, more safety equipment, and more
sophisticated automatic control systems. This fact, plus incorporation of
above steps, should tend to influence oil companies toward a more favorable
atmosphere for acceptance of incorporating FMEA and HA techniques.
6. Engineering Documentation. OCS Orders have resulted in sub-
mission of certain minimal documentation to describe surface safety systems.
This appears to be the only attempt to document a platform system. While
some operators are beginning to see the usefulness of more complete engineer-
ing description, the prevailing control over equipment identification and
description is minimal.
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It is recommended that USGS require that certain minimum engineer-
ing documentation be available at the operator's lowest level onshore engineer,
ing office. This recommendation is made in pursuit of the preceding recom-
mendation and others contained in this report, as well as the USGS stated
objectives of reviewing process equipment designs more closely. The follow-
ing list is recommended as minimum requirements.
a. Structural layout and details *
b. Piping runs
c. Schematic diagrams (mechanical and electrical)
d. Engineering parts list (complete to valve and power supply level,
including part number, name, and manufacturer)
e. Specifications for all actively functioning components.
(The list may be modified by experience of USGS or needs that
developed at a later date.)
7. Wearout Prevention. Preventive maintenance appears to be used
for preventing corrosion of platform structural members, i. e., periodic
replacement of anodes in cathodic systems, sand blasting and painting
operations, etc. However, as previously stated, a replacement upon failure
policy for process equipment seems to prevail. Production equipment is
designed to remain in service for the life of the well and generally does for
wells operating under optimum conditions. There are insufficient records to
analyze replacement frequency or yearly replacement costs for random
failures.
The USGS personnel advance the opinion that inspection frequency,
controlled by OCS Orders, is sufficient to rectify hazards associated with
failure of safety equipment with the exception of wells producing sand. Some
research toward developing a reliable sand detector is being made. One
promising type examined was a wearout probe which could be attached to a
signal or a shut-in system. To accelerate a solution to this problem, the
following action is recommended.
a. Development of a reliable sand erosion probe under USGS
sponsorship (including a specification)
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b. USGS revision of OCS No. 8 specifying method of implementation
of sand erosion probe
c. Requirement for rigorous test and inspection (x-ray/sonic) of
wells upon sand detection.
At a later date when data on failed equipment are available, an
evaluation of the necessary inspection frequency and/or periodic replacement
of selected safety equipment should be undertaken.
8. Training and Certification. One of the basic quality management
techniques used by NASA to ensure that companies meet contractual provisions,
with minimum governmental monitoring, is the requirement for them to train
and to certify, as trained, personnel performing critical manufacturing or
inspection/test functions. This technique is being applied to a limited extent
in some areas of oil industry support operations such as the certification of
welders employed in the manufacture of offshore platforms.
This technique could be applied by USGS to ensure that OCS operators
improve their performance in meeting the requirements of OCS Orders No.
8 and 9, pertaining to inspection and maintenance of safety and antipollution
equipment. Better performance in this area by operators can reduce the risk
of accident and pollution and reduce the amount of monitoring by USGS.
Most of the testing on the OCS of equipment required by USGS is now
performed by personnel of some 27 small companies. Operators contract for
these services on a very informal basis and require neither evidence of
personnel qualification nor standardization of test techniques. It is recognized
that most of this equipment is relatively simple, as are test procedures;
however, some minimum skill is required.
It is recommended that USGS require, through revision or addition of
OCS Orders that:
a. Operators develop methods to ensure that company or contract
personnel performing inspection and test of safety or antipollution equipment
are properly trained in USGS requirements, the equipment functions, test
methods, etc., before performing these services and that training is period-
ically updated as equipment is modified or new types of equipment are utilized.
Operator or outside-source certification of personnel following demonstration
of skill should be required.
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b. Operators provide USGS with a description of the methods to be
employed in accomplishing the above and that these methods be approved in
advance by USGS.
It is also recommended that USGS witness some test performance
and check the certification cards ox records during operator-monitoring
activity.
9. Safety and Antipollution Motivation Program. The study reveals a
consensus that human error is a greater contributor to accidents and pollution
than equipment failure. One of the most effective means for combating human
error is through a well-organized information and motivation program. The
USGS does not require nor participate in any formal motivation programs.
Discussion with oil companies reveals that, in general, maintaining an industry
comparable wage scale is considered adequate employee motivation. A poster
campaign is conducted by at least one company. Top managers of another
company indicated that they strongly support their company safety program.
It is recommended that USGS initiate an OCS-wide safety and anti-
pollution motivation program. Such a program could be effective in terms of
obtaining industry response and favorable publicity. A program consisting of
at least the following elements is suggested.
a. Visual aid package consisting of dramatic evidence of the results of
carelessness and human error (pictures of platform fires, etc.) accompanied
by analysis of typical events leading to accidents and pollution.
b. Periodic review of accident (safety and pollution) records, from
available statistics, with appropriate awards for top performance. The awards
should be public ceremonies with maximum possible publicity.
The Government program could be put together by an outside company
specializing in the field but should be conducted by USGS.
Additional elements recommended to be implemented by offshore
operating companies, with some USGS participation are:
a. Safety training for all field personnel to include identification
and proper use of all safety equipment. Review of all emergency procedures
with periodic drills. Instructions concerning daily operations to avoid
pollution and minimize hazards.
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b. Periodic review of accident and pollution history to field employee
level with recognition for good performance. Recognition would assist in
obtaining cooperation for better reports of incidents.
c. Employee suggestion program regarding safety improvements for
both equipment and operations. Again, a recognition system is recommended
for accepted suggestions.
A possible implementation tool would be the creation of a motivation/
training subcommittee of the Offshore Operators Committee under the leader-
ship of the USGS.
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SYSTEMS DESIGN ANALYSIS
FOR
OIL PLATFORM EQUIPMENT
The concept of a system design analysis has been successfully utilized
by MSFC to determine critical effects for space systems.. Because of the
environment hazards resulting from oil well failures in the Gulf of Mexico,
NASA has been requested to study the feasibility of applying these techniques
for the analysis of offshore oil platform equipment.
In order to evaluate this approach, a preliminary>analysis of the Surface
Safety System of one of the OCS production platforms ^as initiated. This
effort was not completed because of time considerations^and the lack of detailed
documentation of the system; however, an analysis of the basic sensor types
and the master control box has been included to Demonstrate the technique.
From the effort involved in preparing this analysisXit is apparent that an
analysis of the Surface Safety System itself^ilPprovide little suitable informa-
tion. However, an analysis of the entire platform could result in the following
types of data:
1. Determination of all equipinent-failure modes that can lead to
environmental or safety problems
2. Determination that a-ll.potential failures are protected by the safety
system
3. Optimization pf.the safety system design to provide maximum
protection while minimiz ing-possibility of "shut ins" from erroneous sensor
indications
4. Deterroina'tion that the safety system is the best system available
to protect from hazaj-ds^i, e., evaluate several potential safety systems
configurations x/
5. Provision of a documented analysis of the platform showing con-
formance to required safety and environmental standards.
Of these five results, the receipt of a documented analysis appears
most noteworthy as it provides the responsible agencies with documented
assurance that imposed safety requirements have been properly incorporated.
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B. USGS
1. Development of PCS Order Management Program Plan. One of
the prime functions of the USGS Regional Office is to assure compliance with
lease provisions, particularly those detailed in OCS Orders. This function
is similar to that performed by NASA quality personnel in assuring that
contractors comply with contract provisions. NASA has found that effective
assurance of compliance requires planning and implementing an overall
quality management program. USGS has presently in effect a portion of a
planned OCS order management (quality control) effort. (See Section IV. E.,
Adequacy and Scope of OCS Orders.) The need now exists for a complete OCS
Order Management Program Plan to be developed that will outline in detail the
responsibilities, inspection areas, requirements, assigned functions, and the
overall operations of the USGS region and the districts. With the present
number of districts, the increased number of personnel involved in surveil-
lance activities and the enlargement of scope and complexity of the operations,
the need for a plan is acute.
It is recommended that the USGS regional office extend the current
effort by staffing, at the earliest possible time, with personnel experienced in
quality management and capable of developing, documenting, and assisting'the
regional supervisor in implementing this type of program. Asa minimum,
this program plan should contain the following information:
a. Organization chart
b. Functional statement for each section, district, and unit
c. List of reports required of each section, district, and unit
d. Personnel training records
e. Detailed procedures outlining the functions to be performed by
USGS personnel at both the district and regional levels
f. Assignment and frequency of inspection functions
g. List depicting areas to be controlled in performing inspection
functions
h. Guideline procedures covering inspection and/or tests to be
witnessed by USGS district personnel
i. Waiver/departure procedure.
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It is recommended that NASA documents NPC 200-1A, "Quality
Assurance Provisions for Government Agencies," and NHB 5330.7,
"Management of Government Quality Assurance Functions for Supplier
Operations, " be used as guidelines (Item 44, Bibliography) .
The USGS should require that all data generated from this planned
quality effort be assembled at the regional and Washington offices to be
analyzed and evaluated to determine the effectiveness of the district operations.
(Refer to Recommendation No. 2, Section V.A., Information Exchange,
page 14.)
The plan feature of the OCS Order Management Program is valuable
as a management tool not only for regional operations, but for USGS Head-
quarters, in that regional resource needs and activity will be more visible.
2. Operational Use of USGS Water Resources Division Data Develop-
ment Techniques. That portion of a planned OCS Order Management Program
referenced in the previous recommendation concerns the Water Resources
Division study. It is understood that the Conservation Division intends to adopt
the data development techniques used in the study for continued use.
In order that the transition from the study effort to the operational
program can be made as rapidly and effectively as possible, the following
recommendations are made.
a. The data processing equipment, that the team was advised is being
considered for location in the Regional office, should be installled at the
earliest possible time.
b. The presently used Potential Incidence of Non-Compliance (PINC)
list should be modified to separate the gathering of descriptive information
(e. g., number of wells/platforms) from compliance information (e. g.,
satisfactory operation of check valves).
c. A method should be established to ensure that compliance
characteristics of the PINC list are maintained current as OCS Orders are
revised or added.
d. Conservation Division should devise a "best method" of adapting
study techniques to the needs of region operations. An operating procedure
should then be developed and implemented as soon as possible in order to
provide uniform guidance to all concerned personnel. The procedure should
include the instructions for using the information generated by district, region
and headquarters.
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e. The procedure referenced above should be integrated into the
overall OCS Management Program Plan.
3. OCS Order Development. This study group has recognized the
importance of the OCS Orders and their effect on the operation and control of
Federal oil, gas, and sulphur leases in the OCS, Gulf Coast Region. New
technology, additional requirements, and unforeseen and/or unknown changes
in safety and antipollution equipment will necessitate changes in the existing
*OCS Orders or require that new Orders be written.
In order to remain abreast of the ever-changing needs, the following
recommendation is made. The USGS Regional Office should organize an OCS
Order development and implementation function. This function, technical in
nature, involves many hours of research, investigation, and discussion and
should be assigned to a small committee of qualified people selected by the
supervisor. This committee should perform the following:
a. Schedule meetings periodically to review current needs and
evaluate existing Orders
b. Meet with USGS region management to determine their overall
reaction to the proposed order and/or change
c. Schedule meetings with the Offshore Operators Committee and/or
subcommittee and discuss the change and the impact it will have on the
operators and other companies operating in the OCS and document their
comments and/or suggestions
d. Schedule meetings with the USGS district engineers and chief
technicians, discuss the proposed changes, and document their comments
e. If needed, consult with or solicit advice from field officials of other
Government agencies and document their comments
f. Assemble and consolidate the comments into a report for USGS
region management review and evaluation
g. Coordinate for approval with the Washington level
h. After the new Order and/or change has been agreed to by all
concerned, develop the final draft to submit to Washington for signature
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i. After the Order is approved, serve in an advisory and assistance
capacity to USGS management in assuring that concerned USGS and operator
personnel thoroughly understand requirements before implementation and
during implementation.
Adoption of this recommendation should provide a1 more effective
overall program for developing OCS Orders.
4. Standardization of Forms. This recommendation concerns two
reports that are presently being reviewed by region personnel, the contents
of which are important to lease management. The OCS operators are required
to record and report oil spills that occur in the Gulf waters. In reviewing
these reports, a lack of uniformity appears to be in the method of reporting,
which results in information being obtained that is not always sufficient to
properly evaluate the occurrence.
It is recommended that the USGS revise the pollution report form,
presently being utilized in the district offices, and require its use by the
operators for those spills presently requiring written confirmation. The form
should include as a minimum the following:
a. More detailed information, especially in the area of cause and
corrective action. For example, if equipment malfunction is the cause, the
reason should be recorded in detail.
b. The "corrective action taken" remarks should include, in detail,
the repair, if any, that was accomplished to correct the immediate problem.
c. Information should be provided as to action taken to prevent
recurrence.
The OCS Order No. 8 requires the recording of specific test results
at certain intervals and that they be maintained in the field. Operators obtain
these results in two ways: perform the required tests utilizing company
personnel or acquire the services of a third party. Several different forms
are presently being used to record the same type of information. It is
recommended that:
a. The USGS develop a form for the recording of test results that
would standardize this type of reporting by operators or third party personnel.
The form should include cause of and action taken to correct discrepancies
found during performance of required tests.
32
b. The form be provided to operators and its use required; or
operators be required to develop their own forms which will include the same
layout and required information.
c. Operators be required to summarize these results periodically to
determine overall problems.
d. Intended use and completion of the form be included in operator
training courses for personnel to perform tests.
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
National Aeronutics and Space Administration
Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama 35812, March 3, 1972
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